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In the past few years, our sister state of Pennsylvania has fallen victim
to a series of judicial decisions which have done much to preclude any formal
control over the quality of movie films which may be exhibited. Pennsylvania
is here examined because of a recent decision of its Supreme Court, William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana,' and because its present situation reflects
the increased reliance which must now be placed on informal means of control
in this important area.
Three United States Supreme Court decisions of recent years have greatly
affected judicial thought in most courts in the area of obscenity. Burstyn v.
Wilson held for the first time that motion pictures as a medium of expression
are protected by the free speech and press guarantees of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. 2 Consequently it invalidated a New York statute allowing
censors to refuse licenses to films which were found by a board of censors to
be "sacrilegious." The Court decided first that the standard is too vague for
censors to apply without favoring one religion over another, and second,
"that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions
from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints
upon the expression of those views."
3
Roth v. United States made three distinct points which should be kept
in mind in examining the Pennsylvania decisions.4 First, "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."
5 Second, the test
of obscenity should be: "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest."6 Third, the Court held that a statute is not
constitutionally vague and thereby violative of due process if it "conveys
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices." 7
Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicagos the most recent of the major
decisions in the area by the United States Supreme Court, held that prior
censorship of motion pictures was constitutionally possible. Stressing that
no question of vagueness of the standard to be applied by censors was
involved, the Court denied that "... constitutional protection includes
1. 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961).
2. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
3. Id. at 505.
4. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. Id. at 485'.
6. Id. at 489.
7. Id. at 491, -quoting from United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
8. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
a
complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind
of motion picture." 9
In 1956, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hallmark Productions v.
Carroll,'0 struck down the Motion Picture Censorship Act of 1915.11 This
decision marked the beginning of the end for effective censorship. The Act of
1915 authorized a board of censors to disapprove films which are "sacrilegious,
obscene, indecent, or immoral, or such as tend, in the judgment of the board,
to debase or corrupt morals." Use of films without approval of the censor
was unlawful. Reviewing decisions of the United States Supreme Court striking
down as vague other state laws using similar phraseology,12 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the Act violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It did not reach the problem of whether a more
definite statute would nevertheless be invalid as a precensorship of freedom
of speech or press. The final words of the opinion are of interest in light of
subsequent cases. "It need hardly be added that even if all precensorship of
motion picture films were to be held invalid this would not in and of itself
affect the right to suppress objectionable films if exhibited, or to punish their
exhibitor."'
3
Three years after the Hallmark decision, the court, in Commonwealth v.
Blumenstein,14 ruled on a statute, used for forty-eight years, punishing an
exhibitor of any performance or movie "of a lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene,
indecent, or immoral nature or character, or such as might tend to corrupt
morals."'15 Following its reasoning in Hallmark, the court said that since the
words of the statute had individually been ruled vague by the United States
Supreme Court,16 the statute was unconstitutional. But, as pointed out by
Justice Musmanno's dissent, the majority appears to have glossed over the
Roth decision's import. In Roth, in which the words "obscene," "lascivious,"
"filthy," "obscene," and "indecent" were parts of the questioned statutes,
the Supreme Court clearly stated:
Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity
statutes are not precise. This Court, however, has consistently
held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements
of due process. ". . . [T]he Constitution does not require impossible
standards"; all that is required is that the language "conveys
9. Id. at 46.
10. 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
11. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 41-58 (1930). Repealed Sept. 17, 1959, Pa. Laws,
ch. 902, § 15.
12. See, e.g., Burstyn v. Wilson, supra note 2, "sacrilegious"; Commercial Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 346 U.S. 587 (1954),
"immoral" and "would tend to corrupt morals"; Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn,
350 U.S. 870 (1956), "obscene or immoral."
13. Hallmark Productions v. Carroll, supra note 10 at 358, 121 A.2d at 589.
14. 396 Pa. 417, 153 A.2d 227 (1959).
15. Pa. Laws 1939, ch. 872, § 528 (Now Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 18, § 4528 (1959)).
16. See. e.g., authorities cited in Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, supra note 14
at 420, 153 A.2d at 228-29.
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sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices ... " These
words, applied according to the proper standard for judging obscen-
ity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct pro-
scribed and mark ". . . boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges
and juries fairly to administer the law . . . ."-17 (Citations omitted.)
On the same day that Commonwealth v. Blumenstein was decided, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down a decision in Kingsley International
Pictures Corp. v. Blanc.'8 After viewing the film And God Created Woman,
the District Attorney of Philadelphia, defendant, advised plaintiff, distributor
of the film, that the showing of the film would in defendant's judgment violate
Section 528 of the Penal Code (invalidated in Blumenstein) and that anyone
showing it would be arrested. Two Philadelphia theater owners then advised
plaintiff that they would thus be forced to breach their contracts to show the
movie. Kingsley thereupon brought an action to enjoin the District Attorney
from interfering with the exhibition. The complaint alleged that (1) the
statute is so vague as to be unconstitutional; (2) the film is not obscene; (3)
plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if not given relief; (4) there would
be a multiplicity of suits between plaintiff and its many exhibitors. After the
action for injunction was begun, the two Philadelphia exhibitors showed the film
and were arrested. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an injunction
could be granted staying criminal proceedings by the District Attorney against
exhibitors pending the determination of plaintiff's claims that the statute is
invalid and that the particular film is not obscene.
Although recognizing that equity usually will not interfere with criminal
proceedings, the court distinguished the instant situations. The general rule
is based on the idea that the individual has an adequate remedy at law by
raising any possible defense at the criminal trial.'19 But here, the plaintiff's
property would be seriously injured by the actions of the District Attorney;
yet plaintiff would not be party to any resulting criminal action against the
various exhibitors. Since Kingsley had no remedy at law, equity has juris-
diction.
Again Justice Musmanno felt compelled to dissent from the majority
opinion which to him, combined with the Hallmark and Blumenstein cases,
reduced prosecution machinery against obscene films "to a shambles." He
disputes that plaintiff was without adequate remedy at law. By rapid dis-
position of the criminal case, as wished by the District Attorney but opposed
by plaintiff and the exhibitors, the doubt as to the status of the law and the
obscenity of the film would be determined without resort to equity. By this
17. Roth v. United States, supra note 4 at 491.
18. 396 Pa. 448, 153 A.2d 243 (1959); not to be confused with Kingsley Inter-
national Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
19. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888); Duquesne Light Company v. Upper St.
Clair Township, 377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).
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solution plaintiff would then be apprised of the facts and law in which he
was interested without an undue loss of money; yet the public interest would
be served by preventing display of an allegedly obscene movie. Justice
Musmanno regrets that nowhere has the court expressed concern over the
possible deleterious effects of the film on the pubilc and its interest in having
laws enforced. The District Attorney is obligated to enforce laws passed by the
General Assembly to protect the people from those who would attack the
public morals by obscene movies. "That is what District Attorney Victor Blanc
attempted to do in this case and it is incredible that he should be restrained
through the processes of law from doing what the law required him to do."
By means of the injunction and delay in final determination, Kingsley
. . . has squeezed every possible lucrative return out of the film.
It has been run and re-run in many theatres so that even if the in-
junction Kingsley asked for were denied it would lose nothing because
the picture has by now completely exhausted its profits-making
potentialities. Thus, Equity has been made the vehicle for a money-
making scheme on a product which, so far as this Court knows, may
be the filthiest film ever made.20
On July 26, 1961, The Pennsylvania court drove its latest coffin nail into
Commonwealth regulation of obscenity and lewdness in publicly-shown movies.
In William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana,21 it resolved the question unan-
swered by Hallmark that no precensorship of the right to communicate
thoughts and ideas was permissible under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The
court held that the Motion Picture Control Act of 1959 was invalid as violative
of the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions.2 2 This law was the Penn-
sylvania legislature's attempt to fill the gap created by the Hallmark decision.
Under the Act, a board of censors is created by gubernatorial appointment of
members whose only qualification is residency. All films for public showing,
with exceptions for organizations, schools or charities, must be registered
with the board at least forty-eight hours before the first showing. At any
time after the first showing, the board may require an exact copy of the film
for review. A film may be generally disapproved as obscene or disapproved
for showing to children because it is obscene or incites to crime. Anyone showing
or advertising a disapproved film may be punished by six months imprisonment
and/or a $500 to $1,000 fine. After disapproval of a film, the person who
submitted it for examination may demand a re-examination by the board in
his presence and then appeal to the county court of common pleas. An in-
junction to restrain showing of a prohibited film may be applied for by the
board in the court of common pleas.
The majority opinion by Chief Justice Charles Alvin Jones rests upon
20. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Blanc, supra note 18 at 467-8, 153 A.2d
at 252.
21. Supra note 1.
22. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 70.1-70.14 (1959).
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several points varying in weight. Perhaps its strongest argument is that the
statute offends the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Criticism is directed at the lack of qualifications of the censors and the vague-
ness of the standard by which they would decide. This criticism is not without
merit. In an area so touched by controversy even among "experts" (who
may be sociologists, literary authorities, et cetera), it is difficult to justify a
determination by two persons whose only qualification is residency. Perhaps
a number closer to the number in juries would decrease the possibility of
arbitrary or prejudiced decisions. Chief Justice Jones notes that the board's
determination is made without opportunity for the registrant to present his
evidence and opinion, and that upon appeal to the court of common pleas
registrant may win only by establishing that the board acted unreasonably and
arbitrarily. There is not a trial de novo.
The court views the statute as an attempt to meet the standard of
obscenity adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Roth, but it main-
tains that the Roth test required that the allegedly obscene utterance be con-
sidered "as a whole." Here the board may condemn a single frame or view.
This distinction is believed by the court to be sufficient, but a differently-
inclined court might well have looked to the spirit which was implicit in Roth
rather than stretching to find a point of distinction.
Objection is made to a one dollar annual registration fee and a fee of
fifty cents for each twelve hundred lineal feet of film listed with the board.
This is "a plain attempt to tax the exercise of the right of free speech, a
right that exists wholly apart from State authority and whose utilization
a State may not, therefore, license."'23 But this sum is small compared to the
profits of movie exhibitors. It is not an attempt to regulate expression by this
exaction, but a demand by the State for a reasonable fee to cover the expenses
of a control board.
24
The main objection of the court to the Act is that it is a precensorship
of expression which is forbidden by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Article I,
Section 7, declares that "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is
one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak,
write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
The Chief Justice says this sentence "is a direct inhibition on previous restraint
of ark exercise of the protected rights .... ,,25 The Act "expressly restrains"
the first showing of a film for forty-eight hours after notice has been given to
the board. However, this is looking at the statute backwards. The exhibitor
is free to show the film. When he makes his decision as to time, he must then
give the board two days notice. The board may take no action to interfere with
that first showing.
23. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra note I at -, 173 A.2d at 67.
24. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 267 (1935).
25. Supra note 1 at -, 173 A.2d at 61.
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The court maintains that unless there has been a court determination
(in a criminal proceeding for showing an obscene movie) that a movie is
obscene, and thus not constitutionally protected speech, the exhibitor must
be free to show it. Several cogent and appealing arguments against the major-
ity's invalidation of the statute have been made by Justice Eagen dissenting.
Addressing himself to the contention that prior censorship of speech is
allowable in Pennsylvania, he notes that many of the same men who worked
on the Pennsylvania Constitution were present at the framing of the Federal.
Their actions and fears were in the same context in both instances. Throughout
the years Pennsylvania courts have consistently relied on federal decisions
on the United States Constitution in interpreting the State document, and the
United States Supreme Court has ruled that prior restraint is not precluded.20
The majority opinion also holds that the Act conflicts with the right to
trial by jury as guaranteed by Article I, Sections 6 and 9. Since obscenity
was a crime at common law which allowed a jury trial, exhibitors here should
have the obscenity of a film determined by a jury. Justice Eagen's dissent
notes, however, that the legislature is free to create new offenses and preclude
trial by jury. Here the board makes a determination as to the obscenity of
a film before anyone is charged with a crime. The new offense created is
the showing or advertising of a disapproved film. Before making himself subject
to criminal penalties, the exhibitor may appeal the board's finding to a court.
Justice Musmanno analogizes:
When meat inspectors condemn certain meat as tainted, the
butcher may not ask for a jury to smell the meat and count the
organisms in it before the government may act. When a barber
maintains an unhygienic shop and he is ordered to close his shop he
may not insist that a jury be called to examine the sink and cuspidors
before he may be cited for violating the health laws.
2 7
Two major objections may be made to the majority's handling of this
problem. First, the court does what Justice Eagen calls "a little selective
picking" from the State and Federal Constitutions. The Burstyn decision,
based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, held that motion pictures
were included under free speech and press protection. From this decision,
the court concludes impliedly that they are also protected by the State Con-
stitution. Then, however, the court strikes off on its own, ignoring what
United States Supreme Court decisions do not suit its purposes. It uses
Winters v. New York to the effect that a statute so vague and indefinite as
possibly to permit sanctions against protected free speech is void; 28 yet, it
ignores the clear import of Roth that impossible standards of definiteness are
not required. It cites Thomas v. Collins20 to demonstrate the priority and
26. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, supra note 8.
27. Supra note I at -, 173 A.2d at 84.
28. 333 U.S. 507 (1947).
29. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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sanctity of the First Amendment-type freedoms but holds that the Times
Film decision that prior censorship of movies is valid under the United States
Constitution does not apply to the Pennsylvania Constitution. As Justice Eagen
relates, appellees in the instant case twice requested a postponement of the
oral argument to await the decision in Times Film on the ground that it
"involved a question intimately related to the instant appeals." The court
granted the postponements, but since the decision was not to their liking, they
passed over it. Such prejudicial picking and choosing cannot help but detract
from the intellectual esteem in which the opinion is held.
The second major criticism to be leveled at the court is its utter disregard
for the interests of the general public. The great solicitude for the "right"
of movie-makers and exhibitors to'show their products uninterrupted until
a final court determination is clearly evidenced:
No matter how laudably inspired or highly conceived a sump-
tuary statute may be, if its restrictions impinge upon the freedoms of
the individual thus constitutionally guaranteed, it cannot stand.
The harm to our free institutions, which the enforcement of such a
statute would entail, would be of far greater portent than the evil it
was designed to eradicate. 0
This statement was made just after -the court cited Thomas v. Collins on the
preferred status of First Amendment freedoms. But why did the court then
ignore Times Film? There it was said:
Chicago emphasizes here its duty to protect its people against the
dangers of obscenity in the public exhibition of motion pictures. To
this argument petitioner's only answer is that regardless of the capac-
ity for, or extent of, such an evil, previous restraint cannot be jus-
tified. With this we cannot agree. We recognized in Burstyn, supra,
that "capacity for evil . . . may be relevant in determining the
permissible scope of community control," at p. 502, and that motion
pictures were not "necessarily subject to the precise rules governing
any other particular method of expression. Each method," we said,
"tends to present its own peculiar problems." At p. 503. . . . It is
not for this Court to limit the State in its selection of the remedy
it deems most effective to cope with such a problem, absent, of course,
a showing of unreasonable strictures on individual liberty resulting
from its application in particular circumstances.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nowhere has the Pennsylvania court considered whether the restrictions of the
Motion Picture Control Act of 1959 were unreasonable. Nowhere has it
considered the effect on the public of unrestricted showing of any movie. It
has not "balanced" the individual and the public interests. It has not given
cognizance to the existence of the police power. Justice Eagen's dissent quoted
a statement of the court in a previous decision:
The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such
30. Supra note 1 at -, 173 A.2d at 62.
31. Supra note 8 at 49, 50.
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reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority
of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and
morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will.
3 2
The plight of the oppressed movie-producer or exhibitor trying to make
his next million is indeed touching. Now, thanks to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's opinions in the above decisions, he is free to display his movies, no
matter how corrupting and immoral, while he awaits (and perhaps by delaying
tactics postpones) a court determination on his film. By that time, his film's
appeal will have expended itself, and he may begin showing another more
dangerous than the first. Indeed, Justice Musmanno may be correct in fearing
his state may become "a cinematic Gomorrah." The legislature has once again
been defeated in its attempt to protect a vulnerable public from obscenity.
It would appear that even the so-called "stag movies" could now be shown in
theaters to children and teen-agers. Hopefully, the legislature will continue
trying to serve the public need for control, but how many times must it suffer
reverses at the hand of an unbending court? This is the plight of Pennsyl-
vania now. It still may be aided by informal means of control used in many
states-self-regulation within the movie industry by the Production Code or
private action groups such as the Legion of Decency, the National Board of
Review, or the "green sheet" compiled through the efforts of several national
organizations. 3 Although these unofficial controls have had years to develop,
their effectiveness remains uncertain, and does not as yet approximate
statutory regulation. In addition, most states have criminal statutes which can
punish exhibitors for showing obscene movies although they have no boards
of censors. These statutes have not been attacked as in Blumenstein. Penn-
sylvania has tried to give its citizens better protection than is afforded in other
states, but apparently the court does not recognize the need.
ROGER V. BARTH
INVOLUNTARY WAGE AsSIGNMENTS: A NEw APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE EN-
FORCEMENT OF SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
Moral obligations to support dependent persons have been supplemented
by both the common law and statute. As a moral duty alone is legally un-
enforceable, the common law courts and later the legislatures have been
confronted with the problem of either imposing a legal duty upon the proper
persons or allowing the moral obligation to result, through inaction, in a public
burden. The development of the legal duty at common law was a restrictive
32. Buffalo Branch, Mutual Films Corp. v. Breitinger, 250 Pa. 225, 95 At. 433,
436 (1915).
33. See Note, Entertainment: Public Pressures and the Law, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
326 (1957).
